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1. Introduction 
 
A large proportion of human activity occurs as a result of group socialization in which 
the group not only becomes the primary agent for socialization and learning but also in 
affecting decision making and preference formation. Indeed, it is the household and not 
individual consumers that represent the basic consumption unit for the majority of 
consumer goods purchases, both in terms of consumer durables and non-durables. How 
the interaction of individual group members influence the group’s decision making and 
preference formation processes therefore represents an important dimension of our 
understanding of economic behaviour.  
 
The study of group decision making has as its early roots, research undertaken in the 
field of social psychology (see for example Thorndike 1938). Research in the area of 
group decision making has included such facets as individual behaviour in social 
contexts, the impact of within and between group interactions upon group performance, 
and the identification and categorization of means of aggregating individual beliefs and 
preferences into collective group consensus (Baron et al, 1992; Arrow 1963). Recent 
research in marketing has bought renewed interest to the issue of individual group 
member influences upon group decision making (Aribarg et al 2002; Arora and Allenby 
1999; Dellaert et al 1998; for an excellent review of earlier work on group member 
influences on group decision making see Madrigal and Miller 1996). This recent 
research stream has made significant progress with respect to the development and 
testing of mathematical representations of group decision processes capable of 
measuring individual influences upon decision outcomes.  
 
Research conducted by Aribarg et al (2002), Arora and Allenby (1999) and Dellaert et 
al (1998) present useful modelling approaches capable of assimilating the individual 
influences upon group decision making in a manner allowing for the estimation of 
individual attribute specific influences. This differs significantly from the more 
traditional approach of estimating a global group influence (for example Corfman and 
Harlam 1998; Rao and Steckel 1991). The main precept of their research is the notion 
that individuals exercise differential influence within the group upon each attribute and 
not just upon the overall or global group preference. Measurement of the individual 
attribute specific influences entails a multi-stage process whereby group members 
indicate their own preferences before coming together and undertaking the preference 
task as a group. Differences between derived individual preferences and that of the 
group indicate preference revision and concession.  
 
Aribarg et al (2002) conducted two studies; one using a choice based conjoint (CBC) 
task and the second by means of a traditional conjoint undertaking involving a ratings 
task. In both instances, initial preferences of individual members were obtained before 
the parties were brought together in order to communicate their preferences to the other 
group member. Individual post communication preferences were then obtained before 
the process culminated in the members reforming as a group to undertake the task. The 
traditional conjoint task employed in the second study was similar to that used by Arora 
and Allenby (1999). In this earlier study, only a single conjoint task was undertaken 
without group discussion but again prior to the group task. Unlike the Aribag et al 
(2002) study however, Arora and Allenby included a task in which individual members 
were asked to allocate 100 points between themselves and other participating group 
members with regard to the influence each would have in the purchase decision of an 
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oven/lawn mower. Dellaert et al (1998) employed a different empirical process in which 
individual members not only provide information as to their own preferences but also 
project the preferences of other group members with regard to the decision under 
consideration. A second experiment utilizing the same experimental design is then 
undertaken in which the projected influences are revealed to the other group members. 
The experiment concludes with the group jointly reviewing the profiles so as to obtain 
an overall group evaluation.    
 
Whilst offering informative insights into the influences individuals have with regard to 
the decision processes of groups, each of these approaches handle individual group 
members as an exogenous input to the process of group preference formation. An 
alternative approach was introduced by Hensher termed interactive agency choice 
experiments (IACE) (Brewer and Hensher 2000; Hensher and Chow 1999) in which 
endogenous interactions between individual group members (called agents) are 
modelled through a process of feedback and revision. In this paper we revisit the IACE 
methodology and examine new econometric techniques capable of analysing IACE data 
which provide further insights into group decision behaviour.  
 
 
2. Interactive Agency Choice Experiments 
 
Decision contexts involving the interaction between multiple agents involve elements of 
both cooperation and non-cooperation. Both elements will be observed whether 
individual agents attempt to act as a single agent entity such as family members acting 
as a single household in the context of an automobile purchase; or as separate agent 
entities in competition with one another such as a car salesperson attempting to sell a 
motor vehicle to a family. In both cases the preferences of individual agents may be in 
opposition however a convergence of preferences (which may or may not be the goal of 
all agents present) may be achieved through a process of preference revision and 
concession (Aribarg et al, 2002). The end stage of this process of revision and 
concession is that of an equilibrium state represented by either agreement (preference 
convergence) or disagreement (where preferences fail to converge).  
 
The form of agreement arrived at is dependent upon how preferences converge. Possible 
outcomes represent the states of choice and non-choice agreement. Choice agreement 
(or choice equilibrium) will occur when preferences for an alternative converge such 
that the rank order of preference for that alternative is highest for each agent within the 
group. Non choice agreement will occur when the preferences for an alternative 
converge such that the utility for an alternative is simultaneously ranked lower than that 
of the highest ranked alternative for all agents in the system. As such, non-choice 
agreement will result in the rejection of an alternative from the group’s consideration 
set. It is possible for choice and non choice agreement to occur simultaneously however 
the existence of one state does not necessarily imply existence of the other.  
 
The framework of IACEs is such that both independent and interdependent1 preference 
formation strategies and choice outcomes may be analysed and tested for. Whilst similar 
                                                 
1 In his original work, Hensher used the terms sequential and simultaneous. Given that the theoretical 
roots of the IACE lie in Economic Game Theory and the specific use of these terms in that literature, we 
prefer the use of the terms interdependent and independent respectively instead. 
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empirical approaches are employed in both instances, the only difference being in how 
the experiments are administered, the interdependent process as tested in Brewer and 
Hensher (2000) offers the appealing characteristic of allowing for the testing of 
individual agent preferences via the sharing of choice information amongst group 
members.  
 
The IACE methodology is actualized through a stated preference choice experiment in 
which agents are administered a subset of the experimental design such that all agents 
within the same group receive identical profiles. In the interdependent form, the IACE 
commences with the administration of the experiment to the initial or starting agent. As 
a rule, the starting order for the experiment should be randomized unless a natural order 
exists amongst the agents (Hensher 2003). The initial experiment corresponds to the 
first round or round one. The second round consists of the administration of the 
experiment to the second agent under two information conditions - with or without 
knowledge of the prior agent’s choice of alternative for each of the profiles 
administered. In multiple agent experiments, subsequent rounds are defined by the 
administration of the experimental design to successive agents within the group. The 
first pass is concluded when all agents within the group have been administered the 
experiment.  
 
The second pass sees agents administered only with profiles in which choice agreement 
with other agents was not achieved in the first pass. Consider an experiment in which 
three profiles were administered in the initial pass. If for example in two of the profiles 
choice agreement was achieved for all agents, then the second pass of the experiment 
will proceed such that the third profile in which choice agreement was not realized will 
be re-administered to the agents in a new series of rounds. If agreement is made on all 
profiles, the experiment is terminated for that group as agreement equilibrium has been 
achieved. This process may continue for an indefinite number of passes, although it is 
suggested that the experiment be discontinued once the sample size becomes 
sufficiently small as to prevent model estimation. The recursive nature of an 
interdependent IACE for two agents (AGT1 and AGT2) is schematically represented in 
table 1.  
 
The independent IACE form, although yet to be formally empirically tested, differs 
from the interdependent IACE form as described above in that agents are administered 
the experiment and asked to undertake the choice task as a group. Dissent may be 
observed by allowing agents to state their choice of alternative after the group choice 
has been made.  
 
In cases involving more than two agents, a mixture of interdependent and independent 
IACE forms may be utilized. Consider a scenario in which a household consisting of a 
husband and wife are faced with the purchase of a motor vehicle from a salesperson. 
Such a scenario presents three identifiable agents within the group or network, the 
husband, the wife and the salesperson. In the experiment, the researcher may elect to 
use the interdependent IACE from for the husband and wife and a independent IACE 
form between the household and the salesperson. An alternative approach is to not pre-
define the IACE form but rather test the appropriate IACE form as part of the 
experimental design. 
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Table 1. The IACE Structure 
 
Groups    Choice sets Agree      Number Agree  Pass Not Agree         Number not agree 
 
48 1 set      0 
2 sets    0 
3 sets    3 
 
Alt 1               26 
Alt 2               30 
Alt 3               32 
Pass 1 
 
AGT 1                      AGT2  
R1                                      R2 
 
Alt 1–Alt 2                      6 
Alt 1–Alt 3                      8 
Alt 2–Alt 1                      8 
Alt 2–Alt 3                      8 
Alt 3–Alt 1                    11 
Alt 3–Alt 2                    15 
 
  31              1 set    11 
2 sets  15 
                    3 sets    5 
 
Alt 1               8 
Alt 2             10 
Alt 3               9 
Pass 2 
 
AGT 1                      AGT2  
R3                                     R4 
 
Alt 1–Alt 2                      3 
Alt 1–Alt 3                      7 
Alt 2–Alt 1                      4 
Alt 2–Alt 3                      0 
Alt 3–Alt 1                      7 
Alt 3–Alt 2                      8 
 
  19              1 set    11 
2 sets    6 
                    3 sets    2 
 
Alt 1            10 
Alt 2              1 
Alt 3              6 
Pass 3 
 
AGT 1                      AGT2  
R5                                      R6 
 
Alt 1–Alt 2                      0 
Alt 1–Alt 3                      0 
Alt 2–Alt 1                      2 
Alt 2–Alt 3                      1 
Alt 3–Alt 1                      6 
Alt 3–Alt 2                      3 
 
   7               1 set      4 
2 sets    1 
                    3 sets    2 
 
Alt 1              0 
Alt 2              1 
Alt 3              1 
Pass 4 
 
AGT 1                      AGT2  
R7                                      R8 
 
Alt 1–Alt 2                      0 
Alt 1–Alt 3                      0 
Alt 2–Alt 1                      2 
Alt 2–Alt 3                      0 
Alt 3–Alt 1                      6 
Alt 3–Alt 2                      2 
 
 
3. Methodological Approaches to Modelling IACEs 
 
In Brewer and Hensher (2000), the choice experiment was used to produce a set of 
expected utilities resulting in the determination of choice (dis)agreement probabilities 
for each alternative evaluated by the employer/employee dyad for each pass. The 
recursive nature resulting from the interactive process of the IACE method allows for 
the inclusion of prior agent actions being fed to successive agents within the 
experimental framework, and the information state known to agents within a system 
tested at the time of model estimation to determine significance of knowledge of other 
agent actions upon choice. Tests may include model specifications such as a dummy 
variable indicating knowledge of prior agents actions (as in Brewer and Hensher 2000), 
the inclusion of the choice variable of prior agent actions for those granted knowledge 
of such choices within the experiment, or the use of the modelled probabilities as 
derived from the piror agents pass model, again interacted with whether the subsequent 
agent had knowledge of the prior agents choices in the previous round. Thus through the 
experimental manipulation of the knowledge shared throughout the group, tests as to the 
significance of prior knowledge upon the choice made by subsequent agents is possible, 
offering important clues as to the interactive relationships between the agents. 
 
Given the simultaneous choice of a specific alternative by all individual agent members 
within a group, the possibility that the determinants of choice for each agent will differ 
from agent to agent must also be considered. For example, a husband may select a 
particular make and model of automobile based on the cars interior design whilst the 
wife may select the same make and model for its fuel economy. Whilst the same vehicle 
was selected by both individuals, the key decision factors underlying the choice of 
vehicle differed for both parties. To handle this, separate person-specific indirect utility 
functions for each alternative allow for tests as to whether design attributes and 
contextual constructs impact equally across the alternatives and separate model 
specifications for agents (e.g. employees and employers) allow for the testing of 
different sources of influence on each alternative across the group membership types. 
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The pass models derived for each agent are estimated from observations for which both 
choice agreement and choice disagreement was actually observed to have occurred. A 
more general model specification arises if the explanatory variables are interacted with a 
dummy variable indicating whether choice agreement was achieved for a profile or not. 
Such models will produce two parameter estimates for each explanatory variable based 
upon both agreement and non agreement. A Wald test of linear parameter restrictions 
will indicate whether two separate parameters should be estimated or whether a single 
generic parameter should be estimated for each variable. The latter case indicates that 
the weights attached to the modelled variables are equal in terms of whether agreement 
was reached or not for a profile, whilst the former case indicates that different weights 
are associated for the modelled variables for agreement/disagreement. Statistical 
significance of the interacted modelled variables will indicate whether each attribute 
and socio-demographic characteristic influences profile agreement/disagreement.   
 
The models at each pass for each agent type produce probabilities for the selection of all 
alternatives within the profile set. Choice agreement, as determined by the system of 
pass models may be decided through an examination of these probabilities, such that an 
alternative will be selected by all agents if and only if the probabilities produced for that 
alternative are highest for all agents within a pass. Nevertheless, whilst informative, 
such models do not reveal the sources of influence resulting in agreement between 
agents. In order to determine the sources of influence resulting in agreement, we offer 
several possible modelling approaches. The first as related in Brewer and Hensher 
(2000) involves the use of binary choice pass agreement (1, 0) models. Design 
attributes, individual characteristics and individual perceptions may be included to 
determine the specific influences that result in choice agreement. Whilst informative of 
sources of influence, such models will not identify the non-choice agreement 
alternatives. A second possible modelling approach to determine the influences of 
agreement, which will provide insight into non-choice agreement outcomes, involves 
the use of a nested logit model in which the alternatives for any agent dyad are 
represented by the possible choice outcomes (e.g. alt1-alt1, alt2-alt2, alt3-alt3, alt1-alt2, 
alt1-alt3, alt2-alt1, alt2-alt3, alt3-alt1, and alt3-alt2). Figure 1 shows the nested logit 
structure for an agent dyad with three alternatives. 
  
A third possible approach involves taking the difference in the probabilities for each 
alternative for each possible pairing within a group. These probability differences may 
then be used to produce separate regression models for each alternative. As the 
difference between any two probabilities will exist within the range -1 and 1, the use of 
censored regression models is suggested with a -1 and 1 lower and upper bound 
respectively. Further econometric consideration must be given to the likelihood of the 
existence of correlations between the disturbances across the system of equations. For 
this reason, the censored regression or tobit model should be embedded in a recursive 
simultaneous equations model.  
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Figure 1. Nested Logit Agreement Model Tree Structure 
 
Agreement (both choice and non-choice) up to a probability for any given alternative is 
determined as the probability differences estimated approaches zero. Movements away 
from zero towards the upper or lower bounds are suggestive of non-cooperation 
between the agents. To determine choice and non-choice agreement, reference to the 
pass probabilities of the agent dyad is necessary. Non-choice agreement for an 
alternative is determined by the existence of arbitrarily low probabilities derived from 
the agent pass models concurrently with values approaching one for the tobit model 
associated with that particular alternative. Choice agreement is suggested where high 
probabilities exist from the agent pass models. 
 
Given difficulties in estimating recursive simultaneous equations for three or more 
censored regression models, an alternative approach in cases involving more than two 
alternatives is to use the ratio of probabilities for agent dyads instead, thus 
circumventing the necessity for the use of censored regression models. The ratio of any 
two probabilities will have a lower bound of zero with no upper bound. Rather than use 
the censored regression to account for this phenomenon, the log of the ratios may be 
used instead, which is easily modelled within the seemingly unrelated regression 
(SURE) system of equations.  
 
As with the probabilities difference model, choice and non-choice agreement requires 
reference to the pass probabilities of the agent dyad. However, rather than predictions of 
zero suggesting agreement (both choice and non-choice), ratio values approaching one 
indicate agreement up to a probability.  
  
 
4. Empirical Testing 
 
Whilst the studies undertaken by Aribarg et al (2002), Arora and Allenby (1999) and 
Dellaert et at (1998) all examined household dyads consisting of either husband and 
wife or adult and teenager, the data for the study reported here constitutes a dyad of 
employees-employers. The data is that collected by Brewer and Hensher (2000) with an 
additional 28 employee-employer pairs gathered since the time of the original study and 
hence not used in the initial analysis. The data represents a small convenience sample 
consisting of a total of 48 employee-employer pairs from 6 different firms. The 
recruitment process is detailed in Brewer and Hensher (2000). The sample size is 
sufficiently large enough for analysis of the interactive choice experiments for three of 
the four passes of the interaction between employee and employer when expanded for 
the number of choice sets presented to each employee/employer pair per pass. 
 
Alt1-alt1 Alt2-alt2 Alt3-alt3 Alt1- 
alt2
Alt2- 
Alt1
Alt2- 
Alt3
Alt3- 
Alt1
Alt3- 
Alt2 
Alt1- 
alt3 
Choice 
Agreement 
Choice 
Disagreement 
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The context of the IACE related to employee/employer negotiations over the possibility 
to telecommute to work. It was assumed that a natural ordering exists amongst the dyad 
such that employees were automatically designated the initial agent within the 
experiment. The alternatives for this task consisted of either telecommuting one day a 
week, two days a week or to continue with the current workplace practice. This current 
alternative is equivalent to the employee not telecommuting and was defined with 
unchanging attribute levels. As such the current alternative represents a base alternative 
in the experiment. The stated preference design attributes were chosen to relate to the 
dimensions of time, place and distance and were deemed to be the most important 
attributes in forming preferences with regard to distributed work (Brewer & Hensher 
2000). We show the design attributes in table 2. Given five attributes for each 
alternative the experimental design has a total of 10 design attributes of the order 310. 
An orthogonal fractional factorial design allowing for the estimation of all main effects 
plus one selected two-way interaction producing 27 profiles was derived from the full 
factorial. Each employee/employer dyad was then administered with three randomized 
profiles from the 27 set such that each profile was witnessed an equal number of times 
across the sample. 
 
For analysis in this study changes were made to the data as originally analysed. These 
changes included the use of effects coding as opposed to dummy coding for the stated 
preference design attributes so as to avoid confoundment with model constants and the 
use of principle components factor analysis to construct item scales. Although the main 
focus of IACEs is on the interplay of choices made amongst agent groupings given the 
stated preference experimental design, other socio-demographic characteristics  
and attitudinal and perceptual constructs may also impact upon the interaction between 
agent members of a group. As such, the original Brewer and Hensher study (2000) 
included a number of item scales used to collect information about employee’s 
perceptions of their work environment as well as the perceptions of employers on their 
employee’s work environment. 
 
Table 2. Stated Preference Design Attributes 
 
Choice Dimensions Description Participant Questions Response Set 
People contact 
(CONTACT) 
contact with people (internal 
and external) necessary to 
perform work 
If I telecommute the level of contact 
necessary with other people for my 
work would be …. 
1. lower 
2. unchanged 
3. higher 
Control over job 
(CONTROL) 
power over work process(es) If I telecommute the amount of 
control I have over my work would 
be …. 
1. lower 
2. unchanged 
3. higher 
Productivity/effort 
(PROD) 
amount of effort in relation to 
work output 
If I telecommute, my productivity will 
be….  
1. lower 
2. unchanged  
3. higher 
Information (INFO) access to information  
necessary to perform work 
If I telecommute access to 
information necessary for my job 
would be … 
1. location-dependent 
2. limited away from workplace 
3. location-independent 
Career (CAREER) perceived prospects of 
promotion threatened by 
telecommuting 
If I telecommute, my career 
prospects will be… 
1. lower 
2. unchanged 
3. higher 
 
In the original study, summated scales were used for this analysis. These summated 
scales were used to produce similar scale constructs for both agent types as similar 
questions were asked of both employees and employers. For this study, principle 
components factor analysis was conducted separately on the employee and employer 
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perceptions to produce perceptual constructs, the factor scores of which were saved and 
used for analysis. Tables 3a and 3b show the scale items, factor loadings, and variance 
extracted. Coefficient alpha for each construct is also shown. Examination of tables 3a 
and 3b reveals that employees and employers used the question items in different 
manners, thus grouping the items into different constructs than the summated scales 
reported in Brewer and Hensher (2000).  
 
Table 3a. Factor Loadings for Employee Questionnaire Items 
 
  EE_HEIR EE_ROLE EE_CHOIC EE_INT EE_AUTON EE_GOALS 
Even small matters have to be referred to someone 0.821      
Any decision I make has to have my supervisor's 
approval 
0.812      
I have to ask my supervisor before I do almost anything 0.769      
A person who wants to make his/her own decisions 
would be quickly discouraged here 
0.708      
There can be little action taken here until a supervisor 
approves a decision 
0.671      
I know exactly what is expected of me  0.788     
I know what my responsibilities are  0.777     
I feel certain about how much authority I have  0.769     
How often do you see projects or jobs through to 
completion 
 0.651     
Explanation is clear of what is to be done  0.628     
How frequently are you able to tell from your own 
observations how well you are doing your work in terms 
of quantity and quality 
 0.601     
How often are you able to choose the speed at which 
you work 
  0.863    
How frequently are you able to choose the order of 
things you do to complete your work 
  0.836    
I know how to divide my time properly   0.684    
How often are you able to choose the methods you use 
to do your work 
  0.610    
How frequently are you required to talk to other 
workers, supervisors, or customers about work related 
matters while working on your job? 
   0.876   
To what extent is dealing with other people a part of 
your job 
   0.747   
How much are you left on your own to do your work     0.893  
How often are you given information by others (for 
example, other workers, supervisors, customers, etc.) 
about how well you are doing your work in terms of 
quantity and quality 
    -0.688  
Clear, planned goals and objectives exist for my job      0.721 
How often do you talk to other workers, supervisors, or 
customers about non-work matters while working on 
your job 
     0.686 
Scale Coefficient Alpha 0.78 0.75 0.68 0.70 0.71 0.01 
Variance explained 21.04 13.93 11.71 9.18 7.89 6.47 
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Table 3b. Factor Loadings for Employer Questionnaire Items 
 
  ER_ROLE ER_HIER ER_CHOI ER_INT ER_AUTON ER_FEED 
Employee X knows exactly what is expected of him or her 0.848           
Employee X knows what his or her responsibilities are 0.798           
How frequently are you able to tell from your own 
observations how well employee X is doing his or her work 
(in terms of quantity and quality) 
0.656           
Clear, planned goals and objectives exist for employee X's 
job 
0.559           
Employee X cannot take action until I, the supervisor, 
approve the decision 
  0.818         
I need to approve all of employee X's decisions   0.795         
Even small matters have to be referred to someone higher 
up for a final answer 
  0.644         
How often is employee X able to choose the speed at which 
he or she works 
    0.842       
How frequently is able to choose the order of things to be 
done to complete his or her work 
    0.745       
How often does employee X see projects or jobs through to 
completion 
    0.684       
How frequently does employee X talk to other workers, 
supervisors or customers about work-related matters while 
at work 
      0.828     
To what extent is dealing with other people a part of 
employee X's job 
      0.806     
To what extent does employee X's work rely on others 
(individually or as a group) to produce a given amount of 
work 
      0.626     
How much is employee X left to do his or her own work         0.685   
I know employee X has divided his or her own time 
properly 
        0.641   
How often do you give employee X information about how 
well he or she is doing in their work (in terms of quality 
and quantity) 
          0.817 
Scale Coefficient Alpha 0.61 0.76 0.57 0.54 0.29 N/A 
Variance explained 16.92 14.14 11.81 9.72 8.77 6.46 
 
 
5. Results 
 
Tables 4 through 6 show the employee and employer pass models for pass one through 
three respectively.  Due to insufficient observations, models for pass four are not 
reported. The five design attributes representing Contact, Control, Productivity, 
Information and Career prospects were entered linearly into the indirect utility 
expressions for TC1 (telecommute 1 day per week) and TC2 (telecommute 2 days a 
week). For the Current alternative, these attribute levels remained fixed and hence were 
not included in the indirect utility functions for this alternative. The inclusion of the 
scale constructs requires different indirect utility functions for employees and employers 
given that the scale constructs are not directly comparable as a result of different survey 
items loading onto different factors for employees/employers. Also included are several 
untransformed survey questions directly entered into the indirect utility functions. 
 
A direct behavioural interpretation of the parameter estimates reported in tables 4 
through 6 is not possible given the logit transformation of the choice dependent variable 
required for model estimation.  We therefore provide the marginal effects, defined as 
the derivatives of the probabilities, that is δjm =  ∂Pj /∂xm  =  [1(j=m)-PjPm]β, which 
have substantive behavioural meaning (Brewer and Hensher 2000). We interpret the 
marginal effects as the influence a one unit change in an attribute has in the probability 
of selecting a particular alternative, ceteris paribus. The above holds for continuous 
variables only. For effects coded and dummy coded variables, the marginal effects 
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reported represent the derivatives of the probabilities given a change in the level of the 
coded variable (e.g. from low to medium; low to high; medium to high) and thus 
represent the influence of a change in level of the variable upon the probability of 
choosing a given attribute, ceteris paribus.     
 
5.1 Pass 1 
 
For pass one, ‘the level of employee contact thought necessary for work’ is a 
statistically significant influence on the choice of whether to telecommute or not for 
employees but not for employers. The ‘level of control thought necessary’ is statistically 
significant to both groups, whilst the ‘medium level of productivity’ is not statistically 
significant relative to the base (high) level for employees but is statistically significant 
for employers. The ‘amount of information necessary to perform work’ if an employee 
telecommutes is not a statistically significant influence on choice for both of the 
telecommute alternatives for employees and employers. The impact of telecommuting 
‘upon career prospects’ is also a statistically significant influence for both employees 
and employers in choosing to telecommute to work or not. Alternative-specific 
parameter estimates for the career design attribute produced improved model fits for the 
employee model but not for the employer pass one model.  
 
Taking the attribute ‘control’ for example and ignoring the employer model for the 
present, a close examination of the marginal effects reveals that changing from the low 
level (‘If I telecommute the amount of control I have over my work would be lower’) to 
the medium level (‘If I telecommute the amount of control I have over my work would 
be unchanged’) produces a reduction of 0.2616 in the probability of an employee 
selecting the current alternative and increases of 0.1335 and 0.1281 in the probabilities 
of selecting to telecommute one and two days per week respectively, ceteris paribus. 
Movement from the low contact level to the high contact level (‘If I telecommute the 
amount of control I have over my work would be higher’) suggests a reduction in the 
probability of an employee selecting the current alternative in the vicinity of 0.2032 and 
increases in the probabilities of selecting to telecommute one and two days per week of 
0.1017 and 0.1015 respectively, ceteris paribus. Ceteris paribus, changing the contact 
level from the medium to high level produce probability changes of 0.0584, and minus 
0.0317 and 0.0267 for the current, telecommute one and telecommute two days per 
week alternatives respectively.  
 
For employers, a change in the attribute ‘control’ from the low level to the medium 
level produces a change in the probabilities of selecting the Current, telecommute one 
day and telecommute two days per week alternatives of -0.1813, 0.0874 and 0.0939 
respectively. Changing from the low level to the high level produce similar changes of -
0.0995, 0.0485 and 0.0511 whilst changes from the medium level to the high level 
produce probability changes of -0.0818, 0.039 and 0.0428 for each of the alternatives, 
current, telecommute 1 day per week and telecommute two days per week respectively 
ceteris paribus. 
 
Several non-design attributes were also found to be statistically significant for both the 
employee and employer pass one models. Increases in the factor scores for the 
EE_CHOIC and EE_INT variables of one unit increase the probability that an employee 
will select the current alternative by 0.088 and 0.0799 respectively whilst the opposite 
effect is observed for the EE_ROLE variable (-0.1442). Changes in the probabilities for 
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the telecommute one day and two day per week alternatives for EE_CHOIC and 
EE_INT are -.0451 and -0.0429 and -0.041 and -0.039 and 0.0739 and 0.0703 
respectively.  The happier an employee is with their work situation the more likely they 
will elect to telecommute with probability changes of 0.0352 and 0.0346 for the two 
telecommute alternatives given a one unit change in the happiness variable. Ceteris 
paribus, a one unit increase for the factor scales EE_GOALS and EE_HEIR produce 
changes in the three alternatives of 0.0474, 0.0427 and -0.0901 and -0.0968, 0.0427 and 
0.1838 respectively. Also affecting the probability of selecting to telecommute or not is 
the perception of the firm as being family friendly and the requirement for specialised 
software with changes in the probabilities of selecting the current, one day per week and 
two days per week alternatives resulting from a one unit change in the variable being 
0.0271, 0.0244, and  -0.0515 respectively. Surprisingly, the more family friendly the 
organization, the less likely employees are to elect to telecommute two days a week. 
 
Similar interpretations may be made for the employer pass one design and non-design 
variables. Of particular policy interest is the significance of the SAMEMALE and 
SAMEFEM variables. Male-male employee-employer combinations (SAMEMALE =1, 
SAMEFEM=0) suggest a higher probability of the employer selecting the current, non-
telecommuting alternative, whilst a female employer has a higher probability of 
supporting a female (SAMEMALE =0, SAMEFEM=1) employee telecommuting either 
one or two days per week. There exists slight support by a mixed gender employee-
employer combination (SAMEMALE =-1, SAMEFEM=-1) to telecommute either one 
day or two days per week. Examination of the marginal effects suggests a difference in 
the probability for a male-male employee/employer combination selecting the current, 
non telecommute alternative over a female-female combination of a magnitude of 
0.3056 and a 0.2014 probability difference between the male-male combination and a 
mixture of genders. Also of policy interest is the finding that employers appear less 
likely to support employees telecommuting to work who are classified as managers, 
with an increase in the probability of 0.3242 selecting the current alternative for 
managers over non manager employees.  Included in the employer pass one model are 
the probabilities for the alternatives derived by the employee pass one model. At the 
five percent level, the probabilities are not significant influences upon the choice of 
alternative as predicted by the employer pass one model, however the employee pass 
one probabilities are significant at the ten percent level for the telecommute one day per 
week alternative. The with/without information state was not statistically significant at 
either the five percent or ten percent level suggesting that having knowledge of the 
employees chosen alternative was not an influence on the choice of alternative made by 
employers. This suggests that the employers were acting as separate behavioural entities 
whose choices were not influenced by the choices of their employees. 
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Table 4. Employee and Employer Pass 1 Models 
 
SOURCE ATTRIBUTE ALTERNATIVE PASS 1 EE 
(T stats) 
Marginal 
Effects 
[Current, 
TC1, TC2] 
SOURCE ATTRIBUTE ALTERNATIVE PASS 1 ER 
(T stats) 
Marginal 
Effects 
[Current, 
TC1, TC2] 
  CONSTANT Current -1.572 (-1.16191)    CONSTANT Current 0.0959341 
(0.11233) 
 
 CONSTANT TC1 -3.72868  (-3.35348)   CONSTANT TC1 -3.38093 (-
2.85343) 
 
SP CONTACT L TC1, TC2 -0.707629  (-2.17465) SP CONTACT L TC1, TC2 -0.41609 (-
1.45508) 
SP CONTACT M TC1, TC2 0.577952  (2.11024) 
[-16.71, 
8.48, 8.26]a 
   [-11.52, 
5.84, 5.71]b  
   [5.2, -
2.65, -
2.56]c 
SP CONTACT M TC1, TC2 0.247581 
(0.953592) 
[-7.97, 
4.08, 3.9]a  
   [-7.84, 
4.01, 3.83]b  
   [0.14, -
0.07, -
0.07]c 
SP CONTROL L TC1, TC2 -1.22364  (-3.92779) SP CONTROL L TC1, TC2 -0.801687 (-
2.70135) 
SP CONTROL M TC1, TC2 0.848171  (3.2379) 
  [-26.16, 
13.35, 
12.81]a 
    [-20.32, 
10.17, 
10.15]b  
[5.84, -
3.17, -2.67 
]c 
SP CONTROL M TC1, TC2 0.798276 
(3.12604) 
  [-18.13, 
8.74, 9.39]a  
[-9.95, 
4.85, 5.11]b  
 [-8.18, 3.9, 
4.28]c 
SP PRODUCTIVITY L TC1, TC2 -1.59291  (-4.68845) SP PRODUCTIVITY L TC1, TC2 -1.77306 (-
4.33318) 
SP PRODUCTIVITY M TC1, TC2 0.538929 (1.9532) 
[-30.05, 
14.59, 
15.46]a  
    [-35.87, 
17.42, 
18.45]b 
[-5.83, 
2.83, 3.0]c 
SP PRODUCTIVITY M TC1, TC2 0.695287 
(2.30808) 
 [-29.25, 
14.47, 
14.78]a  
 [-32.8, 
16.11, 
16.69]b 
 [-3.55, 
1.64, 1.91]c 
SP INFORMATION L TC1, TC2 0.0926519 (0.338433) SP INFORMATION L TC1, TC2 -0.068408 (-
0.243953) 
SP INFORMATION M TC1, TC2 -0.330309  (-1.3539) 
[5.48, -
2.86, -
2.63]a  
    [-14.54, 
6.43, 8.14]b  
    [-7.83, 
4.11, 3.74]c  
SP INFORMATION M TC1, TC2 0.172458 
(0.689344) 
   [-2.56, 
1.3, 1.26]a  
[0.39, -0.2, 
-0.19 ]b 
[2.95, -1.5, 
-1.45]c 
SP CAREER L TC1 -1.92461 (-3.95141) SP CAREER L TC1, TC2 -0.839995 (-
2.69515) 
SP CAREER M TC1 0.432709 (1.2004) 
[-13.94, 
25.12, -
11.18]a  
    [-22.32, 
40.52, -
18.2]b  
    [-8.38, 
15.4, -
7.02]c 
SP CAREER M TC1, TC2 0.539458 
(1.92766) 
[-15.29, 
7.92, 7.37]a  
 [-12.94, 
6.72, 6.22 
]b [2.36, -
1.2, -1.16]c 
SP CAREER L TC2 -1.28094 (-2.88913) CONSTRUCT SAMEMALE Current 1.55957 
(3.05267) 
SP CAREER M TC2 1.46231 (3.71633) 
[-17.54, -
15.26, 
32.8]a  
    [-6.75, -
CONSTRUCT SAMEFEM Current -1.34981 (-
2.83883) 
[-30.56, 
15.97, 
14.58]a  
 [-20.14, 
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5.57, 
12.32]]b 
    [10.8, 
9.69, -
20.49]c 
11.11, 9.03 
]b  
 [10.42, -
4.86, -
5.56]c 
SCALE EE_CHOIC Current 0.702514 (2.29032) [8.8, -4.51, 
-4.29] 
SCALE ER_CHOIC Current 1.82599 
(4.33285) 
[19.48, -
10.04, -
9.43] 
SCALE EE_INT Current 0.604343 (2.30977) [7.99, -4.1, 
-3.9] 
SQ MANAGER/PROFESSIONAL Current -4.40949 (-
3.03598) 
[32.42, -
15.7, -
16.72] 
SCALE EE_ROLE Current -1.18158 (-3.81951) [-14.42, 
7.39, 7.03] 
SQ FAMILY Current -0.740153 (-
3.18277) 
[-7.89, 
4.07, 8.82] 
SQ HAPPY Current -0.50033 (-2.05648) [-6.86, 
3.52, 3.46] 
SQ ABSENCE Current 1.04669 
(4.35322) 
[11.16, -
5.76, -5.40] 
SCALE EE_GOALS TC2 -0.773198 (-2.8303) [4.74, 4.27, 
-9.01] 
PROB YEARS OF EMPLOYMENT TC1 0.0801991 
(1.86812) 
[-0.44, 1.0, 
-0.56] 
SCALE EE_HIER TC2 1.54622 (3.66048) [-9.68, -8.7, 
18.38] 
PROB STATUS TC1 1.58111 
(2.25895) 
[-8.7, 
19.51, -
10.81] 
SQ FAMILY TC2 -0.401713 (-1.70203) [2.71, 2.44, 
-5.15] 
 PROB PASS 1 EE TC1 1.8579 
(1.76858) 
[-10.22, 
22.92, -
12.7] 
SQ SOFTWARE TC2 -2.27805 (-3.27438) [13.37, 
12.3, -
25.67] 
  PROB PASS 1 EE TC2 -1.1283 (-
1.24448) 
[5.83, 7.72, 
-13.54] 
No. of observations   144    144  
 
Constants only Log-Likelihood (β) at convergence -156.47474   -158.01255 
Log-Likelihood (β) at convergence -88.13836   -86.76509 
 
-2 Log-Likelihood  136.67276   142.49492  
Degrees of freedom  20   20  
Chi-square (χ2)   31.4    31.4  
N.B. SP = stated preference, SCALE = Factor analyzed scale, SQ = Survey Question; Construct = developed from SQs; PROB = Agent Pair's prior probabilities 
L = Low level; M = Medium Level    
a Marginal effect for effects code: low level to medium level    
b Marginal effect for effects code: low level to high level    
c Marginal effect for effects code: medium level to high level    
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5.2 Pass 2 and 3 
 
Tables 5 and 6 show the employee and employer pass two and three models. 
Examination of both the employee and employer pass-two models reveal that design 
attributes, previously observed to be statistically significant in pass one, are no longer 
so. Indeed, for the employer second pass model not a single design attribute is observed 
to be statistically significant. For employees, the low level of productivity is the only 
design attribute that remained statistically significant for the two passes, whilst the low 
information attribute - previously not observed to be statistically significant - becomes 
so in the second pass. With regard to the non-design attributes, for the employee pass 
two model all the variables with the exception of the software dummy variable are 
statistically significant and are thus modelled. Whilst several of these variables have 
been entered into different indirect utility functions than in the pass one employee 
model, importantly, the signs for these variables suggest similar influences upon choice 
response as in the prior model. Interestingly, several new variables are statistically 
significant in the second pass employee model which were not statistically significant in 
the first pass model.  
 
The second pass employer model reveals that the same gender mix variables are 
statistically significant for male-male combinations but are no longer statistically 
significant for female-female combinations. Again, as with the pass one employer 
model, male-male employee-employer combinations suggest a higher probability of the 
employer selecting the current, non telecommuting alternative, a similar result as found 
in the employee pass two model. In a similar fashion to the employee pass two model, 
those variables inclusive of both pass models for employers have similar signs (but 
different wights) suggesting that they influence in the same direction, the choice of 
alternative. Examination of the pass two employee probabilities when included as part 
of the pass two employer model suggest that, given a higher probability of the employee 
selecting the telecommute one day a week, there exists a higher probability of the 
employer supporting this position. Nevertheless, this support does not extend to the 
other options available. 
  
 
6. Comparison of Passes 
 
One benefit of the IACE format is the ability to test subsequent model specifications on 
each successive pass. In doing so, changes in the influences of preference may be tested. 
In table 5 we report the log-likelihood test for comparing the pass one model 
specification for the second pass of employees. With one degree of freedom, the 
likelihood ratio is 30.18 suggesting that the second pass model produces a better model 
fit for the second pass than does the first pass model specification used on the second 
pass observations. Due to insufficient observations, we cannot report such a test for the 
employer pass two model. 
 
Whilst interesting, we note that pass models produced subsequent to the first pass must 
be analysed with some care. Firstly, the number of observations diminishes from pass to 
pass, in line with the amount of agreement for each profile agreed to in the previous 
pass. Secondly, as a result of the above and as shown in table one, pass two consists of 
only those who failed to achieve agreement in pass one. Likewise, pass three consists of 
observations arising from those who failed to reach agreement in pass two. As a result, 
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the pass models for each agent should be considered in light of the results as related in 
table one, which demonstrate how agents revise and concede their position in order to 
achieve agreement from pass to pass.  
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Table 5. Pass 2 Models for Employee and Employers 
 
SOURCE ATTRIBUTE ALTERNATIVE PASS 2 EE 
(T stats) 
Marginal 
Effects 
[Current, 
TC1, TC2] 
SOURCE ATTRIBUTE ALTERNATIVE PASS 2 ER 
(T stats) 
Marginal 
Effects 
[Current, 
TC1, TC2] 
  CONSTANT Current 1.15384 (0.277074)    CONSTANT Current -2.14142 (-0.934338)  
 CONSTANT TC1 -0.712789 (-0.173946)   CONSTANT TC1 -0.550943 (-0.662785)  
SP CONTACT L TC1, TC2 0.0176536 (0.018326) SP CONTACT L TC1, TC2 -0.519672 (-0.836414) 
SP CONTACT M TC1, TC2 0.473924 (0.746192) 
[-3.63, 1.13, 
2.51]a  
 [-3.53, -
1.59, -1.94]b  
 [7.16, -2.17, 
-4.45]c 
SP CONTACT M TC1, TC2 0.158773 (0.342222) 
[-8.93, 5.36, 
3.57]a  
 [-10.71, 
5.36, 5.36]b  
 [-1.79,0, 
1.79]c 
SP CONTROL L TC1, TC2 -0.804477 (-1.29958) SP CONTROL L TC1, TC2 -0.817071 (-1.56898) 
SP CONTROL M TC1, TC2 0.829494 (1.3482) 
[-11.09, 
5.02, 6.07]a  
 [-5.31, 2.17, 
3.14]b  
 [5.78, -2.85, 
-2.93]c 
SP CONTROL M TC1, TC2 0.747479 (1.49747) 
[-16.07, 
8.93, 7.14]a  
 [-8.93, 3.57, 
5.36]b  
 [-7.14, -
5.36, -1.79]c 
SP PRODUCTIVITY L TC1, TC2 -3.04571 (-2.18591) SP PRODUCTIVITY L TC1, TC2 -0.780147 (-1.33343) 
SP PRODUCTIVITY M TC1, TC2 1.2465 (1.54924) 
[-28.57, 
14.29, 
14.29]a  
 [-32.1, 15.5, 
16.6]b  
 [-3.57, 1.79, 
1.79]c 
SP PRODUCTIVITY M TC1, TC2 0.169813 (0.340398) 
[-8.93, 3.57, 
5.36]a  
 [-14.29, 
7.14, 7.14]b  
 [-5.36, 3.57, 
1.79]c 
SP INFORMATION L TC1, TC2 -2.41301 (-2.16293) SP INFORMATION L TC1, TC2 -0.443825 (-0.880217) 
SP INFORMATION M TC1, TC2 1.57976 (1.51504) 
[-25.8, 10.6, 
15.3]a  
 [-20.74, 
7.86, 12.88]b  
 [5.11, -2.74, 
-2.37]c 
SP INFORMATION M TC1, TC2 0.7451 (1.85945) 
[-10.71, 
5.36, 5.36]a  
 [-1.79, 0, 
1.79]b  
 [8.93, -5.36, 
-3.57]c 
SP CAREER L TC1, TC2 -1.69721 (-1.3407) SP CAREER L TC1, TC2 -0.321364 (-0.675239) 
SP CAREER M TC1, TC2 0.124027 (0.135544) 
[-10.94, -
4.67, 6.27]a  
 [-20.89, 
10.18, 
10.72]b  
 [-9.95, 5.5, 
4.45]c 
SP CAREER M TC1, TC2 0.342997 (0.741416) 
[-7.14, 3.57, 
3.57]a  
 [-3.57, 1.79, 
1.79]b  
 [-3.57, 1.79, 
1.79]c 
Construct SAMEMALE Current 2.168 (2.17639) CONSTRUCT SAMEMALE Current 2.33847 (1.98137) 
Construct SAMEFEM Current -0.831039 (-0.804547) 
[-25.63, 9.7, 
16.86]a  
 [-28.98, 
11.24, 
17.74]b  
 [-3.35, 1.46, 
0.88]c 
CONSTRUCT SAMEFEM Current -2.01135 (-1.23804) 
[-33.93, 
19.64, 
14.29]a  
 [-5.36, 3.57, 
1.79]b  
 [-7.14, 3.57, 
3.57]c 
SCALE EE_CHOIC Current 2.25046 (2.35674) [15.58, -
7.35, -8.2]  
SCALE ER_AUTON Current -3.47692 (-2.53629) [-33.82, 
16.91, 
16.89] 
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SCALE EE_GOALS Current 2.33237 (2.35239) [16.15, -
7.62, -8.53] 
SQ ABSENCE Current 2.44776 (2.10717) [23.81, -
11.92, -
11.89] 
SCALE EE_ROLE Current -2.47735 (-2.53961) [-17.16, 8.1, 
9.06] 
SQ FAMILY Current -1.23376 (-2.11451) [-12.0, 6.0, 
6.0] 
SQ CLERK Current -3.00046 (-1.96418) [-21.46, 
9.09, 12.36] 
PROB PROB PASS 2 EE TC1 4.57128 (2.4113) [-22.26, 
56.03, -
33.77] 
SCALE EE_INT TC1 1.71931 (2.16582) [-5.62, 
12.65, -7.03] 
PROB PROB PASS 2 EE TC2 0.788041 (0.646633) [-3.83, -
5.82, 9.65] 
SQ VIEW TC2 0.923591 (2.15565) [-3.38, -
3.78, 7.16] 
     
SQ HAPPY TC2 1.65562 (1.69224) [-6.06, -
6.77, 12.83] 
     
SQ ABSENCE TC2 -2.19081 (-2.25966) [8.01, 8.96, -
16.97] 
     
SQ FAMILY TC2 -1.0205 (-2.28644) [3.73, 4.17, -
7.9] 
     
No. of observations   56        56  
Constants only Log-Likelihood (β) at convergence -60.17291     -61.17896  
Log-Likelihood (β) at convergence  -20.71979     -31.49118  
-2 Log-Likelihood  78.90624     59.37556  
Degrees of freedom  21     17  
Chi-square (χ2)   32.7        27.6  
Pass 1 model log-Likelihood (b) at convergence* -35.8117     Insufficient Sample Size  
Pass 2 model log-Likelihood (b) at convergence -20.71979     -36.75385  
-2 Log-Likelihood  30.18382     N/A  
Degrees of freedom  1     N/A  
Chi-square (χ2)   3.84        N/A  
* Using the same model specification as in pass 1       
N.B. SP = stated preference, SCALE = Factor analyzed scale, SQ = Survey Question; Construct = developed from SQs; PROB = Agent Pair's prior probabilities  
L = Low level; M = Medium Level        
a Marginal effect for effects code: low level to medium level    
b Marginal effect for effects code: low level to high level    
c Marginal effect for effects code: medium level to high level    
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Table 6. Pass 3 Models for Employee and Employers 
 
SOURCE ATTRIBUTE ALTERNATIVE PASS 2 EE (T stats) 
Marginal Effects 
[Current, TC1, TC2] SOURCE ATTRIBUTE ALTERNATIVE 
PASS 2 ER 
(T stats) 
Marginal Effects 
[Current, TC1, TC2] 
  CONSTANT Current -5.172 (-2.55254)    CONSTANT Current -3.65987 (-1.55799)  
 CONSTANT TC1 1.89463  (1.8568)   CONSTANT TC1 -1.40826 (-1.14332)  
SP CONTACT L TC1, TC2 1.84072 (1.54765) SP CONTACT L TC1, TC2 0.70892 (0.600692) 
SP CONTACT M TC1, TC2 -1.46789 (-1.19474) 
[13.79, -3.45, -10.34]a  
 [20.69, -3.45, -17.24]b  
 [6.9, 0, -6.9]c SP CONTACT M TC1, TC2 -1.18088 (-1.06149) 
[[17.24, -6.9, -10.34]a  
 [6.9, -3.45, -3.45]b  
 [-10.34, 3.45, 6.9]c 
SP CONTROL L TC1, TC2 1.05007 (1.07403) SP CONTROL L TC1, TC2 -0.913011 (-1.01662) 
SP CONTROL M TC1, TC2 -0.214885 (-0.29903) 
[[-6.9, 0, 6.9]a  
 [-24.14, 3.45, 20.69]b  
 [-17.24, 3.45, 13.79]c SP CONTROL M TC1, TC2 1.11729 (1.23837) 
[-20.69, 6.9, 13.79]a  
 [-3.45,-3.45,0.0]b  
 [17.24, -3.45, -13.79]c 
SP PRODUCTIVITY L TC1, TC2 -1.09619 (-1.39527) SP PRODUCTIVITY L TC1, TC2 -0.318223 (-0.264371) 
SP PRODUCTIVITY M TC1, TC2 -0.51214 (-0.568349) 
[8.16, -2.87, -5.29]a  
 [-9.08, 3.91, 8.51]b  
 [-15.75, 3.91, 15.17]c SP PRODUCTIVITY M TC1, TC2 1.19555 (1.00098) 
[-17.24, 6.9, 10.34]a  
 [10.34, -6.9, -3.45]b  
 [27.59, -13.79, -13.79]c 
SP INFORMATION L TC1, TC2 -0.123108 (-0.108106) SP INFORMATION L TC1, TC2 -3.31473 (-1.93659) 
SP INFORMATION M TC1, TC2 -0.929545 (-1.28284) 
[-17.24, 3.45, 13.79]a  
 [-48.28, 13.79, 34.48]b  
 [-31.03, 10.34, 34.48]c SP INFORMATION M TC1, TC2 1.91952 (1.58528) 
[-27.59, 10.34, 17.24]a  
 [-34.48, 13.79, 21.69]b  
 [-6.9, 3.45, 3.45]c 
SP CAREER L TC1, TC2 -2.34793 (-2.31386) SP CAREER L TC1, TC2 -2.58013 (-1.57665) 
SP CAREER M TC1, TC2 -1.03229 (-1.07305) 
[-52.72, 13.79, 37.93]a  
 [-52.72, 13.79, 37.93]b  
 [0.0,0.0,0.0]c SP CAREER M TC1, TC2 1.25085 (1.34924) 
[-27.59, 10.34, 17.24]a  
 [-13.79, 3.45, 10.34]b  
 [13.79, -6.9, -6.9]c 
Construct SAMEMALE Current -4.10435 (-2.70541) SQ ABSENCE Current 2.55039 (2.11149) [25.49, -10.78, -14.71] 
Construct SAMEFEM Current 2.18021 (2.32855) 
[0.0, 0.0, 0.0]a  
 [-41.38, 10.34, 31.03]b  
 [-41.38, 10.34, 31.03]c      
SQ PROB PASS 2 ER TC1 -23.326 (-2.28434) [52.98, -172.17, 119.18]      
SQ PROB PASS 2 ER TC2 -9.88684 (-2.62768) [84.05, 50.52, -134.56]      
No. of observations   29        29  
Constants only Log-Likelihood (β) at convergence -28.4598     -26.45834  
Log-Likelihood (β) at convergence  -15.25871     -15.83673       
-2 Log-Likelihood  26.40218     21.24322  
Degrees of freedom  14     11  
Chi-square (χ2)   23.7        19.7  
Pass 1 model log-Likelihood (b) at convergence* Insufficient sample size     Insufficient sample size  
Pass 3 model log-Likelihood (b) at convergence -12.58835     -13.46672  
-2 Log-Likelihood  N/A     N/A  
Degrees of freedom  N/A     N/A  
Chi-square (χ2)   N/A        N/A  
Pass 2 model log-Likelihood (b) at convergence** Insufficient sample size     Insufficient sample size  
Pass 3 model log-Likelihood (b) at convergence -12.58835     -13.46672  
-2 Log-Likelihood  N/A     N/A  
Degrees of freedom  N/A     N/A  
Chi-square (χ2)   N/A        N/A  
* Using the same model specification as in pass 1       
* Using the same model specification as in pass 2       
  19 
N.B. SP = stated preference, SCALE = Factor analyzed scale, SQ = Survey Question; Construct = developed from SQs; PROB = Agent Pair's prior probabilities  
L = Low level; M = Medium Level        
a Marginal effect for effects code: low level to medium level    
b Marginal effect for effects code: low level to high level    
c Marginal effect for effects code: medium level to high level    
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7. Agreement and Disagreement 
 
Table 7 presents for the first pass, a model specification in which each of the modelled 
variables have been interacted with a dummy variable indicating 
agreement/disagreement. Given the IACE format in which the employer either accepts 
or rejects the alternative chosen by the employee in the previous round, we present here 
only the agreement/disagreement interaction model for employers in pass one. This 
model represent a more general form of the pass one employer model in that design and 
non-design variables are allowed to vary according to whether agreement for a profile 
was reached or not. By using a Wald test to test for linear restrictions in the parameters, 
it was found that the design attribute information, both at the low and medium levels 
should be modelled without being interacted with agreement/disagreement (Wald est for 
one linear restriction; χ2 = 11.24 and 4.35 respectively). The same gender variables 
(SAMEMALE: χ2 = 6.3 and SAMEFEM: χ2 = 3.96) and the probabilities derived from 
the pass one employee model (χ2 = 18.66) also were found to be set to equality for 
agreement/disagreement. Testing the linear restrictions mentioned above jointly using a 
Wald test with five linear restrictions produced a χ2 value of 20.82. All other variables 
are allowed to vary for agreement/disagreement. 
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Table 7. Pass 1 Agreement Interaction Model 
 
SOURCE ATTRIBUTE ALTERNATIVE PARAMETERS  
(T stats) 
Marginal Effects 
[Current, TC1, TC2] 
  CONSTANT Current 0.996062 (1.05574)  
 
CONSTANT TC1 -0.226158 (-0.240271)  
SP CONTACT LA TC1, TC2 -0.839769 (-1.65165) 
SP CONTACT MA TC1, TC2 0.861327 (2.15468) 
[-23.61, 14.58, 9.03]a  
 [-12.5, 7.64, 4.86]b  
 [11.11, -6.94, -4.17]c 
SP CONTACT LDA TC1, TC2 -0.78665 (-1.48942) 
SP CONTACT MDA TC1, TC2 0.533246 (1.31426) 
[-19.44, 11.81, 7.64]a  
 [-15.28, 9.03, 6.25]b  
 [4.17, -2.78, -1.39]c 
SP CONTROL LA TC1, TC2 -0.821897 (-1.72468) 
SP CONTROL MA TC1, TC2 0.558164 (1.49134) 
[-20.83, 12.5, 8.33]a  
 [-16.67, 9.72, 6.94]b  
 [4.17, -2.78, -1.39]c 
SP CONTROL LDA TC1, TC2 -0.499687 (-1.21169) 
SP CONTROL MDA TC1, TC2 0.772109 (2.03214) 
[-18.06,11.11, 6.94]a  
 [-4.17, 2.08, 1.39]b  
 [13.89, -9.03, -5.56]c 
SP PRODUCTIVITY LA TC1, TC2 -1.75972 (-2.8238) 
SP PRODUCTIVITY MA TC1, TC2 0.769307 (1.76783) 
[-38.19, 21.53, 16.67]a  
 [-40.97, 23.61, 17.36]b  
 [-2.78, 2.08, 0.69]c 
SP PRODUCTIVITY LDA TC1, TC2 -1.63671 (-3.1185) 
SP PRODUCTIVITY MDA TC1, TC2 0.896292 (2.12858) 
[-36.11, 21.53, 14.58]a  
[-34.72, 20.83, 13.89]b  
 [1.39, -0.69, -0.69]c 
SP INFORMATION LOW* TC1, TC2 -0.673758 (-2.15117) 
SP INFORMATION MED* TC1, TC2 0.580237 (2.14052) 
[-17.36, 9.72, 7.64]a  
 [-11.11, 6.25, 4.86]b  
 [6.25, -3.47, -2.78]c 
SP CAREER LA TC1, TC2 -0.883701 (-1.78206) 
SP CAREER MA TC1, TC2 0.114088 (0.292579) 
[-15.28, 9.72, 5.56]a  
 [-24.31, 15.28, 9.03]b  
 [-9.03, 5.56, 3.47]c 
SP CAREER LDA TC1, TC2 -0.179218 (-0.419059) 
SP CAREER MDA TC1, TC2 0.150257 (0.348539) 
[-4.86, 3.47, 1.39]a  
 [-3.47, 2.08, 1.39]b  
 [1.39,-1.39, 0.0]c 
SQ SAMEMALE* Current 1.1738 (2.95056) 
SQ SAMEFEM* Current -0.353882 (-0.980538) 
[-22.22, 12.5, 9.72]a  
 [-27.78, 15.97, 11.81]b  
 [-5.56, 3.47, 2.08]c 
SQ ABSENCE A TC1 0.765067 (3.4446) [10.76, -6.6, -4.16]  
SQ ABSENCE DA TC1 0.414827 (2.03327) [5.83, -3.58, -2.57] 
Prob PROB PASS 1 EE* TC1 2.73012 (2.48174) [-23.57, 35.11, -11.56] 
SQ EMPLOY A TC1 0.155665 (2.82259) [-1.34, 2.0, -0.66] 
SQ EMPLOY DA TC1 0.129068 (2.15113) [-1.11, 1.66, -5.46] 
Prob PROB PASS 1 EE A TC2 4.1083 (2.78349) [-22.34, -17.39, 39.78] 
Prob PROB PASS 1 EE DA TC2 -5.55037 (-3.28849) [30.18, 23.5, -53.68] 
SQ VIEW DA TC2 0.888849 (3.36382) [-4.83, -3.76, 8.59] 
Restricted log likelihood function -158.01255      
Log likelihood function at convergence             -89.17597    
Degrees of freedom 28    
-2 log likelihood 137.67316    
Chi-square (χ2) 41.3      
N.B. SP = stated preference, SCALE = Factor analysed scale, SQ = Survey Question; from; PROB = Agent Pair's prior probabilities 
LA = Low level x Agree; MA = Medium Level x Agree; LDA = Low level x Disagree; MDA = Medium Level x Disagree 
* Parameters restricted to equivalence for agree and disagree   
a Marginal effect for effects code: low level to medium level 
b Marginal effect for effects code: low level to high level 
c Marginal effect for effects code: medium level to high level 
 
Figure 2 shows the part-worth utilities for the productivity design attribute for the 
telecommuting alternatives. Given that the medium attribute level for productivity, 
when interacted with the agree dummy variable, is statistically equal to zero, we have 
set the part-worth utility to zero in the figure. For both agree and disagree interactions, 
the part-worth utilities for the telecommuting options increase as we move from the low 
attribute level to high attribute level. However we note a greater change in the part-
worth utility level for the productivity attribute interacted with disagreement as we 
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move between the low and medium levels of the productivity design attribute than 
exists for productivity when interacted with agreement. Examination of the other part-
worth utility plots produce similar findings, with the one exception of the probabilities 
derived from the employee pass one model for the telecommute two days per week 
option. In this instance we note that, as the probability of the employee selecting the 
telecommute two days a week alternative increases, the utility for an employer who 
agrees with the employees choice increases, whilst the utility for an employer who does 
not agree with their respective employee decreases. This represents the only divergence 
in the signs for the part-worth utilities for the modelled variables.   
 
Once more, in addition to the parameter estimates, the marginal effects are also 
reported. Comparing the marginal effects for the productivity design attribute we note 
similar influences upon choice of alternative when moving from the low level to the 
medium level of the attribute when the attribute is interacted with 
agreement/disagreement. From the model, for the current, telecommute one day per 
week and telecommute two days per week alternatives, the changes in probabilities 
respectively are -0.3819, 0.2153, and 0.1667 for productivity interacted with agreement 
and -0.3611, 0.2153, and 0.1458 for productivity interacted with disagreement. Larger 
differences exist when productivity is interacted with agreement/ disagreement with a 
movement between the low and high level (-0.4097, 0.2361, and 0.1736 for productivity 
interacted with agreement and -0.3472, 0.2083, and 0.1389 for productivity interacted 
with disagreement). This suggests that for profile sets in which agreement was reached, 
there exists a higher probability of selecting a telecommute alternative than for profile 
sets in which agreement was not reached. 
 
-4
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1
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Figure 2. Productivity Design Attribute interacted with Agreement/Disagreement 
 
Table 8 shows the binary agreement logit models for passes one and two. Given the 
IACE methodology, only the binary agreement model for the employer is relevant in 
pass one, hence no model is shown for employees for this pass. With the exception of 
the career at the medium level for the pass-two employee binary agreement model, no 
design attributes are statistically significant in determining agreement/disagreement. In 
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pass one, a one unit increase in the scale construct ER_FEED and an increase in the 
length of service of the employee by one year increase the probability of the employer 
agreeing with the alternative choice of the employee by 0.06 and 0.01 respectively. A 
one unit increase in terms of how the employer views the absence of the employee 
negatively results in a decrease of 0.05 in terms of the probability of agreement being 
achieved. Other findings suggests that if the employee is a manager, or if the employer 
and employee are both male, there is a decrease in the probability of agreement of 0.23 
and 0.17 respectively in pass one. In pass two, if the view that the employer will support 
telecommuting  
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                                                         Table 8. Pass 1 and 2 Binary Agreement Models 
 
ER Pass 1 Agreement Model EE Pass 2 Agreement Model ER Pass 2 Agreement Model 
Variable* Coefficient (T stat) Marginal Effects Variable Coefficient (T stat) Marginal Effects Variable Coefficient (T stat) Marginal Effects 
CONSTANT 0.668445 (2.50768)  CONSTANT 16.5421 (4.03824) CONSTANT -1.17955 (-1.17245)
CONTACT L 0.0421236 (0.224477) 0.01 CONTACT L -0.445211 (-0.823219) -0.11 CONLOW -0.277139 (-0.684183) -0.07 
CONTACT M 0.149252 (0.919164) 0.04 CONTACT M 0.597984 (1.42034) 0.15 CONMED 0.269375 (0.813866) 0.07 
CONTROL L -0.00578221 (-0.0307464) 0.00 CONTROL L -0.785221 (-1.74034) -0.2 CONTLOW -0.681043 (-1.73945) -0.17 
CONTROL M -0.0846145 (-0.513293) -0.02 CONTROL M -0.50964 (-1.19094) -0.13 CONTMED -0.450093 (-1.25953) -0.11 
PRODUCT L 0.0297266 (0.161218) 0.01 PRODUCT L 0.656066 (1.27037) 0.16 PRODLOW 0.621642 (1.60185) 0.16 
PRODUCT. M -0.0832985 (-0.512331) -0.02 PRODUCT. M -0.23589 (-0.598346) -0.06 PRODMED -0.111717 (-0.344381) -0.03 
INFO L -0.306586 (-1.65123) -0.07 INFO L -0.813605 (-1.63753) -0.2 INFOLOW -0.510611 (-1.34395) -0.13 
INFO M 0.0362267 (0.216429) 0.01 INFO M 0.69423 (1.63423) 0.17 INFOMED 0.4278 (1.22092) 0.11 
CAREER L 0.0356877 (0.192635) 0.01 CAREER L -0.245947 (-0.503681) -0.06 CARELOW -0.13484 (-0.35308) -0.03 
CAREER M -0.051793 (-0.313091) -0.01 CAREER M -1.05306 (-2.44982) -0.26 CAREMED -0.259742 (-0.783957) -0.06 
ER_FEED 0.243744 (2.31968) 0.06 EE_AUTON -1.28148 (-3.01503) -0.32 ER_CHOIC 0.497188 (1.99745) 0.12 
EMPLOY 0.0438668 (2.15163) 0.01 EE_CHOIC -1.08548 (-3.14434) -0.27 ER_HIER -0.685555 (-2.43944) -0.17 
ABSENCE -0.208339 (-2.57362) -0.05 EE_GOALS -0.27189 (-0.645198) -0.07 FAMILY -0.855748 (-4.71764) -0.21 
MANAGER -0.921513 (-2.94212) -0.23 EE_HIER -1.38221 (-3.34161) -0.34 VIEW 0.90265 (3.47946) 0.23 
SAMEMALE -0.716526 (-3.5705) -0.17 EE_INT 1.61529 (3.53935) 0.4 SAMEMALE -0.778473 (-2.41262) -0.19 
SAMEFEM 0.149839 (0.848905) 0.04 EE_ROLE -1.01801 (-3.36364) -0.25 SAMEFEM -0.559248 (-1.72179) -0.14 
  FAMILY -0.432942 (-1.62068) -0.11 CLERK 1.68836 (3.01037) 0.39 
  VIEW 0.431779 (1.55233) 0.11    
  HAPPY -3.03564 (-4.03603) -0.76    
  ABSENCE -1.66357 (-3.09907) -0.41    
  SAMEMALE -1.27448 (-2.27087) -0.32    
  SAMEFEM -0.320137 (-0.605285) -0.08    
  MANAGER -5.17847 (-2.11754) -0.65    
  CLERK 3.1524 (3.97743) 0.64    
Restricted log likelihood function   -288.6833 -116.3416  -116.3416
Log likelihood function at convergence   -267.5107    -57.61877       -77.20662  
Degrees of freedom 16    24  17  
-2 log likelihood 42.3452    114.13236  78.26996  
Chi-square (χ2) 26.3     32.7  27.6  
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increases by one unit, the probability of agreement increases by 0.11. A one unit 
increase in the value observed for the EE_INT construct also increases the probability 
of agreement by the employee by 0.4. Increases in the constructs EE_AUTON, 
EE_CHOIC, EE_GOALS, EE_HEIR and EE_ROLE decrease the probability of an 
employee reaching agreement in terms of choice of alternative with the employer for 
pass 2. Once more, male-male employee-employer combinations significantly reduce 
the probability of choice agreement over a female-female combination by 0.32. For the 
employee, being a manager reduces the probability of agreement by 0.65 whilst being a 
clerk increases the probability of reaching choice agreement by 0.64. 
 
For the second pass employer binary agreement model, different influences are 
observed to influence choice agreement than were observed from the first pass employer 
binary agreement model. Observing increases of one unit in the ER_CHOIC construct 
increase the probability of agreement by 0.12, whilst a one unit increase in the 
ER_HEIR results in a decrease in the probability of choice agreement by 0.17. The 
more the employer believes that the organization is family friendly, the lower the 
probability of choice agreement (a one unit increase decreases the probability of 
agreement by 0.21) whilst a one unit increase in the view that increased work hours is 
undesirable as held by the employer increases the probability of choice agreement by 
0.23. As with the previous binary choice agreement models, male-male employee-
employer dyads decrease the probability of choice agreement over female-female 
combinations by 0.19. As with the employee pass two model, if the employee is 
employed as a clerk choice agreement is more likely to occur (an increase in the 
probability of choice agreement of 0.39).  
 
The previous round probabilities and the information of the previous round choice 
outcomes were also tested. In no binary agreement model were these variables 
statistically significant. This finding suggests that knowledge of the previous round 
choice outcomes do not influence agreement/disagreement.        
 
The binary agreement models reported in table 8 provide information as to the sources 
of influence on choice agreement. Earlier we outlined several modelling strategies 
capable of deriving information with regard to non choice agreement. Table 9 shows the 
result for pass one for a system of seemingly unrelated regression models (SURE) in 
which the dependent variable used is the ratio of the pass one probabilities as estimated 
from the pass one employee/employer pass models (Prob(ee)/Prob(er)). Whilst 
theoretically the log of the ratio of the probabilities should be modelled we have used 
the untransformed ratio for ease of interpretation.  
 
Three regression models, one for each alternative, are estimated, with the equations 
linked through their disturbance terms.  Interpretation of each model is relatively 
straightforward. Ratio values derived from the regression models reported in table 9 that 
are less than one indicate that for the alternative being investigated, the employer has a 
higher probability of selecting that alternative over the employee. Ratio values 
exceeding one imply that the employee has a higher probability of selecting that 
alternative over the employer. Values approaching one indicate a convergence of 
probabilities for that alternative. Agreement in this instance does not necessarily 
translate to selection but rather that the agents agree as to the probability of selecting 
that particular alternative. Choice agreement is likely to occur for alternatives for which 
the highest probabilities, as observed from the pass models, exist concurrently,, with the 
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ratios of the probabilities of the agents approaching one. The interpretation of the model 
output is relative to the starting probability ratios for each individual agent pair. For 
example, assume that the probabilities of selecting the Current, TC1 and TC2 
alternatives for an employee are 0.60, 0.11 and 0.29 respectively and 0.89, 0.06 and 
0.05 for the partnered employer. The probability ratios for this pairing are therefore 
0.67, 1.83 and 5.8. Taking for example the same gender variables, if the employee and 
employer are both male, the signs of the parameters for all of the models for different 
alternatives suggest movements in the probability ratios away from one, thus suggesting 
a lesser likelihood of agreement, with the estimated ratios for the three alternatives 
being -0.005, 2.86, 6.5. If both agents are female, the direction in shift for the ratios of 
the probabilities suggests a preponderance for cooperation. The estimates for the ratios 
being 1.01, 0.7, 5.2. This result suggests that, given the starting probabilities, female-
female agents are likely to cooperate in selecting, up to a probability, the current 
alternative. Nevertheless, convergence in agreement for other alternatives is also 
witnessed. Similar figures can be computed for same sex pairs.  
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Table 9. Pass Ratio of Agent Probabilities SURE Models 
 
 
Alternative Current TC1 TC2 
Source Variable Coefficient (T-value) Coefficient (T-value) Coefficient (T-value) 
  Constant -1.655 (-4.34) 0.5671 (2.199) -0.606 (-1.603) 
SP CONTACT L   -0.029 (-0.449) -0.106 (-0.98) 
SP CONTACT M  0.0707 (1.172) 0.1535 (1.602) 
SP CONTROL L  -0.088 (-1.303) -0.574 (-5.682) 
SP CONTROL M  -0.147 (-2.353) 0.1368 (1.331) 
SP PRODUCTIVITY L  0.3848 (5.713) 0.0114 (0.106) 
SP PRODUCTIVITY M  -0.207 (-3.288) -0.169 (-1.723) 
SP INFORMATION L  0.0413 (0.638) 0.1315 (1.321) 
SP INFORMATION M  -0.341 (-5.638) -0.503 (-5.132) 
SP CAREER L  -0.683 (-10.578) -0.556 (-5.318) 
SP CAREER M  -0.142 (-2.285) 0.7348 (7.472) 
SCALE ER_AUTON -0.174 (-3.596)  -0.291 (-4.039) 
SCALE ER_CHOIC -1.219 (-11.222) 0.5167 (5.156) 0.4292 (4.368) 
SCALE ER_FEED -0.190 (-2.081) -0.408 (-4.679) 0.2346 (2.888) 
SCALE ER_ROLE -0.127 (-2.67)   
SCALE EE_CHOIC 0.6091 (9.473)   
SCALE EE_HIER -1.014 (-9.245) -0.866 (-8.518) 0.6747 (6.979) 
SCALE EE_INT 0.2512 (4.409)  -0.468 (-5.602) 
SCALE EE_ROLE -0.779 (-9.224) 0.3578 (4.351) -0.637 (-8.17) 
SCALE EE_GOALS  0.2028 (3.51)  
SQ SAMEMALE -0.679 (-4.28) 1.0253 (6.561) 0.7030 (5.057) 
SQ SAMEFEM 0.3399 (2.053) -1.130 (-7.013) -0.553 (-3.538) 
SQ MANAGER/ PROF. 3.2127 (10.363) -0.963 (-3.268) -0.745 (-2.731) 
SQ FAMILY (ER) 0.2841 (4.631) -0.274 (-4.559)  
SQ ABSENCE (ER) -0.727 (-9.876) 0.3154 (4.722) 0.2767 (4.158) 
SQ VIEW (ER) 0.2365 (4.776)  0.3737 (5.251) 
SQ ABSENCE (EE) 0.2403 (4.825)   
SQ FAMILY (EE) 0.0468 (5.815) -0.188 (-4.654) -0.353 (-48.622) 
SQ VIEW (EE)  0.2204 (5.491)  
SQ LENGTH OF SERVICE (EE)  -0.078 (-7.103)  
R2   0.85 0.66 0.96 
Constants only Log-Likelihood (β) at convergence -353.0255 -282.0551 -434.2485 
Log-Likelihood (β) at convergence -206.5074 -192.0143 -183.2709 
-2 Log-Likelihood  293.0362 180.0816 501.9552 
Degrees of freedom  16 23 22 
Chi-square (χ2)   26.3 35.2 33.9 
 
 
8. Discussion 
 
In this paper, we have provided a framework, linked to a specific choice setting, within 
which we can identify the attributes that members of a network take into account when 
making a choice. This method allows for the estimation of agent- and attribute-specific 
sensitivities upon choice. We have further shown how the sources likely to influence 
cooperation may be discovered and estimated. Using different econometric modelling 
techniques, both choice and non-choice cooperation may be estimated. 
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Although the data used for the study is that of an organizational context, the method is 
easily generalizable to non organizational settings. Indeed understanding the decision 
process in any context in which individual’s negotiate the choice outcome as part of a 
group may benefit from the use of the IACE method. Additionally, the technique is 
further generalizable to groups or networks with greater than two group members as 
discussed in this paper. 
 
Future research in the area of IACE will require the examination of independent as well 
as joint independent and interdependent forms of data collection. Modelling techniques 
and analytical tests to determine the best form of data collection will need also to be 
shaped although established experimental design techniques offer useful directions for 
such future research efforts.   
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